George Mason U economist to present paper on voting rights in antebellum U.S. on Mon 3/23.

Monday March 23rd at 4:00 p.m. in Hepburn 105, Jeremy Horpedahl, Department of Economics, George Mason University, will present, "Political Exchange and Voting Rights: The Demand for Public Goods in the Early American Republic, 1790-1860."

Abstract:  The expansion of democracy in the Early American Republic, 1790-1860, was a gradual yet cumulatively dramatic process. I argue that state-level extensions of the voting franchise were driven primarily by mutually beneficial political exchanges to provide public goods. Militia service was the major public good demanded in this era, and suffrage was used to ensure continued provision. Wartime experiences often spurred demand for protection, as well as helped militia members overcome collective action problems. The potential for abuse of the franchise was controlled through implicit threats to revoke the franchise. The threats were made credible by simultaneously disenfranchising other groups in society.